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I. Introduction
The Administrative Council of the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU)' has accepted the recommendation of the Maitland
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1. The ITU is a United Nations agency but predates the UN by eighty years. Its role has been
primarily to regulate the technical and administrative functioning of telephone, telegraph, and
broadcast systems as they passed national boundaries. To this end, it allocates frequencies to
avoid technical interference, established methods of collecting accounts for international
system use between countries, standards for interconnection of facilities and networks and,
more recently, has provided technical and developmental assistance for new systems.
The primary decision-making body of the ITU is the Plenipotentiary Conference, composed
of all one hundred and sixty signatories of the ITU's basic treaty, the International Telecom-
munications Convention. While the tradition is that decisions are made by consensus, when
votes are taken the result is based upon the majority of those present and voting. The decisions
must be ratified by the governments of the members to become effective.
Administrative conferences are called on an as-needed basis by the Plenipotentiary to discuss
specific issues on a regional or worldwide level and are governed by the same procedures as
Plenipotentiaries. An example is the World Administrative Radio Conference being held this
year to consider the rules and procedures to be used in assigning satellite orbital locations (1985
Space WARC). The issues and results of the 1985 Space WARC will be the subject of a
forthcoming Current Developments article in The International Lawyer.
The Administrative Council has thirty-six delegates, elected by the members, and is responsi-
ble for administering all ITU functions between Plenipotentiaries. It meets yearly and, if
necessary, can obtain a vote on a particularly important issue from all members by correspon-
dence. Again, decisions are preferably by consensus, but if a vote is necessary, a simple
majority rules so long as at least twenty-four voting members are present and sixteen vote
affirmatively. For a history of the ITU and details of its organization and operation, see
G. CODDING, JR. & A. RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION IN A
CHANGING WORLD (1982).
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Commission 2 that it establish a new Center for Telecommunications De-
velopment whose purpose would be to provide planning and technical
assistance to developing countries for improvement of their telecommunica-
tions infrastructure. 3 Such a center could be another controversial interna-
tional organization into which the United States (U.S.) is called upon to
pour funds to support bureaucracies promoting causes the U.S. opposes.4
Or, it could perform as the Commission envisions: to provide objective
technical expertise and assistance to countries whose economic develop-
ment would be spurred by an improved telecommunications infrastructure.
In the latter case, because these countries must obtain equipment and
expertise to fulfill their telecommunications needs from others, at least
initially, it would be in the interest of U.S. industry to encourage and assist
this development.
The U.S. telecommunications industry stands to benefit more than its
foreign competitors. This center, staffed by disinterested professionals and
assisting developing countries with financing their telecommunications proj-
ects, could offset some of the disadvantages under which U.S. businesses
currently labor. Although the U.S. has a comparative advantage in telecom-
munications trade and services, it is running a trade deficit in this field.5 This
change of events, since 1983, has created a flurry of bills in Congress offering
various proposals designed to reverse this trend.6 Most take a retaliatory
2. The Commission requested that the Council establish the Center at its July, 1985 meeting.
In addition, it requested that its report be considered by the participants in the Bonn Economic
Summit Meeting in May. Although these issues were not considered at Bonn, they were raised
at the OECD Ministerial Meeting in April. The resulting Communique spoke only in very
general terms, however, and merely recognized the importance of communications and in-
formation flows in the world economy.
3. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.S. disenchantment with
UNESCO and the call for a new world information order.
5. The telecommunications equipment trade deficit in 1983 was $418 million; in 1984 it was
$1.040 billion. These deficits reversed a sixty-five year history of U.S. trade surplus in this field.
See NTIA, ISSUES IN DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS: DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 165
(1985).
6. S. 1404, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S9184-85 (Daily ed. July 9, 1985) (directs
President to respond to unfair trade practices by Japan within ninety days of enactment);
H.R.1808, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1676-77 (Daily ed. Mar. 28, 1985) (directs
President to take action against any country running trade surplus with U.S. and engaging in
trade barriers); S.774, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S3562-64 (Daily ed. Mar. 28,
1985) (directs President to take retaliatory action in-kind against Japan to reduce U.S. trade
deficit to $27 million within two years); S.770,99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S59914-95
(Daily ed. May 9, 1985) (3-year 20% import surcharge on all Japanese imports); S.906, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S4191-93 (Daily ed. April 16, 1985) (sliding scale surcharge
on imports pegged to size of U.S. trade deficit); S.1449, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC.
S9630-34 (Daily ed. July 17, 1985) (25 percent surcharge on U.S. imports from countries with
trade barriers to U.S. exports); H.R.3035, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H5972 (Daily
ed. July 18, 1985) (companion bill to S.1449); S. 761, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC.
S3474-75 (Daily ed. Mar. 26, 1985) (sliding scale surcharge on imports pegged to size of U.S.
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approach against trade barriers perceived in developed countries, particu-
larly Japan and the European Communities. 7
This article explores the advantages and disadvantages to the U.S. of the
Center proposed by the Maitland Commission. It will review the conclu-
sions of the Maitland Commission and the premises upon which they are
based. It will then consider the recommendations in the particular light of
U.S. interests and past experiences and the effects upon U.S. industry.
Finally, it will indicate opportunities available to the legal community.
II. The Maitland Commission
What has become known as the Maitland Commission was officially
created as The Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunica-
tions Development by the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference held in 1982 in
Nairobi.8 The Commission's mandate was to recommend ways in which
worldwide telecommunications expansion could be stimulated.
There has long been an instinctual recognition of the relationship between
economic development and a telecommunications infrastructure, but only
recently have empirical studies generated any objective data from which
specific conclusions could be drawn. 9 It appears that there is a point in the
trade deficit); H.R. 2120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S3474-75 (Daily ed. Apr. 18,
1985) (sliding import surcharge pegged to U.S. domestic federal deficit); H.R.1139, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H407 (Daily ed. Feb. 19, 1985) (20 percent import surcharge
on all imports); S.942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S4332-39 (Daily ed. Apr. 17,
1985) (specifies retaliatory trade actions against countries with trade barriers to U.S. telecom-
munications products and services); S.728, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S3342-43
(Daily ed. Mar. 20, 1985) (prohibits entry of Japanese telecommunications exports into U.S.
until Japanese market opened to U.S. telecommunications equipment); H. R.2037, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. E1461-62 (Daily ed. Apr. 15, 1985) (requires FCC to apply
reciprocity in certifying imported telecommunications equipment); S. 1505, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S10100-01 (Daily ed. July 25, 1985) (retaliatory quoted to reduce
imports from countries with trade barriers to U.S. exports); S. 1493, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. REc. S10079-120 (Daily ed. July 25, 1985) (reforming U.S. trade laws to provide for
earlier imposition of duties in positive determinations); H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONG. REC. H6980 (Daily ed. July 31, 1985) (president to take action under § 301 on telecom-
munications trade barriers or FCC directed to apply reciprocal certification procedures).
7. Nonbinding retaliation resolutions urging the President to take action against Japan if
Tokyo does not permit the import of more U.S. goods have passed both the House and Senate.
H.C.R.106, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S1711-12 (Daily ed. Apr. 2, 1985);
S.C.R.15, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S1579 (Daily ed. Feb. 20, 1985). S.1404, by
Sen. Packwood, is essentially the same as S.C.R.15. Sen. Packwood's bill has been passed by
the Senate, but the House has not acted as of the time of writing.
8. The Commission took its name from its chairman, Sir Donald Maitland, and was com-
posed of seventeen members from representative countries.
9. A comprehensive summary of these studies is contained in J. SAUNDERS, J. WARFORD &
B. WELLENIUS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1983). See also Com-
munications Technology and Economic Development: A Case Study of Africa (1984) (pro-
ceedings of workshop organized by the National Science Foundation and the Agency for
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process of economic development at which telecommunications becomes a
catalyst and from which point economic development and telecommunica-
tions development are engaged in mutual reinforcement. 10
Recognizing these factors after reviewing relevant studies and the status
of telecommunications worldwide,' 1 the Commission proffered the follow-
ing recommendations.1 2 It suggested an "intermediate step," the establisl-
ment of a Center for Telecommunications Development in 1985 under the
auspices of the ITU.13 The Center would be organized with three primary
units. One would focus upon development policy, collecting information
upon the experiences of other countries and making it available to develop-
ing countries to aid them in formulating policy. 14 Its staff would be limited to
ten members.1 5 A second unit's function would be to advise in the preinvest-
ment stage on organization and planning, training, procurement, mainte-
nance, tariffs and the like.1 6 The Commission suggests that it would have a
full-time staff augmented by a part-time staff for individual studies and
projects.' 7 The third group would provide operations support in im-
plementing policy objectives. 18
The Center's governing body would be an Advisory Board of ITU mem-
bers appointed by the Secretary-General of the ITU in consultation with the
Administrative Council. 19 The cost of the Center is estimated at ten million
International Development) [hereinafter cited as Telecommunications and Economic De-
velopment].
10. See, e.g., Jonscher, Assessing the Benefits of Telecommunications, INTERMEDIA 22 (Jan.
1985). Of course, economic development is by no means the sole reason for improving the
telecommunications infrastructure. Of equal importance are communications for health ser-
vices, national emergencies, and protecting food supplies. To the extent, however, that a
telecommunications infrastructure is profitable in itself and serves as a catalyst for increased
economic development, these other important communications needs will also be met.
11. Noteworthy statistics revealed that two-thirds of the world's population have no access to
a telephone, that Tokyo has more telephones than the entire African continent. THE MISSING
LINK: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR WORLDWIDE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DEVELOPMENT 13 (1985) [hereinafter cited as MISSING LINK].
12. Many suggestions were directed to the developing countries, such as increasing the level
of investment, planning, training and overall commitment directed towards telecommunica-
tions development. MISSING LINK id., at 65-69. This article focuses upon those recommenda-
tions to be implemented by the industrialized countries, as directed towards governments,
international institutions, and the private sector.
13. Id. at 67.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Secretary-General is Richard Butler. The current members of the Administra-
tive Council are Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Spain, USA, France,
India, Indonesia, Algeria, Federal Republic of Germany, Saudia Arabia, Australia, Benin,
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mexico, Philippines, German Democratic Republic,
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dollars a year. The Commission left open the source of its funding, although
it suggested such possibilities as devoting a small proportion of revenues
from international calls and contributions by private industry of funds and
experts to staff the Center.20
The other major role for the industrialized world envisioned by the
Commission involves financing telecommunications development. Al-
though telecommunications is a lucrative source of revenue, its establish-
ment is capital-intensive,21 and the revenue generated is primarily in domes-
tic currency while investment capital usually requires foreign exchange. 22
The development banks are an obvious source of funding, but the World
Bank has traditionally served as a lender of last-resort, believing that
commercial loans, while not having terms as favorable as those from the
World Bank, are readily available.23 The Commission suggests that these
banks assign greater priority and resources to telecommunications develop-
ment. 24 Another possibility is the establishment of a revolving fund speci-
fically for financing telecommunications networks in developing countries. 25
III. Prospects For Action
The ITU Administrative Council has approved a resolution to establish
the Center, but U.S. support is not yet assured because of the potential
drawbacks.
A. RISKS
Two of the potential drawbacks-each grounded in recent experience in
telecommunications development-pose risks for the utilization of a new
Center. One involves the politicization of international fora; the other the
use of new international bureaucracies for protectionism.
The politicization of UNESCO has been well documented and has re-
sulted in a decision by the U.S. to withdraw. 26 The pursuit of the "New
World Information Order" within UNESCO merits examination here be-
cause the pressures that propelled that issue persist unabated. 27 These
pressures include a feeling in the Third World that the U.S. preeminence
Romania, United Kingdom, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, USSR, Vene-
zuela, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
20. Id. at 55.
21. Telecommunications and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 12-14.
22. Id. at 62.
23. Id.
24. MISSING LINK, supra note 11, at 68.
25. Id.
26. See T. BROWN, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS GLOSSARY 1-52 (1984); J. GUNTER, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE DEBATE ON THE WORLD INFORMATION ORDER 3-85 (1979).
27. Id. at 1.
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in computers and communication technology somehow threatens the
sovereignty of developing nations, that U.S. media export "cultural im-
perialism," and that U.S. information is biased against Third World
concerns. 28 Included in the agenda of various proponents of the New World
Information Order are such goals as the following: control over the news
media to strengthen national political control, control over information and
communication to enhance national economic and social development,
assistance in developing hardware, software and personnel infrastructures,
obtaining revenue from licensing, tariffs and fees, and "balance" in the flow
of information.29
Demand for a New World Information Order has always been associated
with the call from the same quarters for a New International Economic
Order.30 The clamor over communications issues arose almost simul-
taneously in the United Nations and UNESCO and has been increasingly
heard at meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, the ITU (which has
focused predominantly on technical matters), the UN Conference on Sci-
ence and Technology for Development (UNCTAD) and the 1979 World
Administrative Radio Conference (WARC).3 1
The 1979 WARC, like the one beginning this year, heard demands for
more equitable sharing of the electromagnetic spectrum and geostationary
orbit "as the common property of mankind.",32 The WARCs, called by the
ITU, have heard dissatisfaction expressed over the "first-come, first-
served" approach to allocating spectrum which the ITU has followed since
its organization in the mid-nineteenth century. 33 Developing countries are
pressing for a priori assignments of satellite orbital locations and associated
frequencies to assure their possession of adequate spectrum if and when
they acquire the technology in future. The U.S. has expressed concern that
this could inhibit the most efficient use of spectrum resources and develop-
ment of new technology.34 An a priori system requires that assignments be
made on the basis of existing technology. Once these assignments are
"locked in" on this basis, there would be no incentive to develop new
technology because no benefits could accrue from it.
28. Id.
29. Primoff, Introduction, in II COMMUNICATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (1983).
30. Skrobiszewski, An Overview of the Problems, Perspectives and Developments in Interna-
tional Communications and Information Flow, in I ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
(1981).
31. GUNTER, supra note 26, at 1.
32. Spero, The Economic Dimension in II COMMUNICATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 35
(1983).
33. GUNTER, supra note 26, at 8.
34. Developing Countries' Demands Key to U.S. Space WARC Proposal, BROADCASTING 24
(July 15, 1985).
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There is no certainty, of course, that the proposed Center for Telecom-
munications Development will be gripped by the same emotions that have
prompted U.S. unwillingness to work through UNESCO. The point is that
technological development must not be assumed as equating with progress.
Many Third World nations are fearful that Western domination of new
information technologies will increase the gap in economic development
between them and the developed nations. 35 So U.S. cooperation in the
Center might be viewed with suspicion. 36
Both developing and developed countries now view information as essen-
tial for economic growth. In their efforts to grow, some nations are tempted
to promote domestic processing and advanced information industries by
discouraging the flow of data across their boundaries. 37 This form of protec-
tionism is evidenced in a number of Third World countries, including Brazil,
which has served as something of a model for other developing countries. In
a study for the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, Brazil
urged protection of infant information industries through an array of trade
barriers.38
The developing countries have taken steps to foster links among such
nations and to reduce dependency on the Western world. In 1955 in Ban-
dung, at the first conference of Non-Aligned Nations, there was a call for
more communication between developing countries. In 1979 there were
moves toward more formal technical cooperation between developing coun-
tries (TCDC).3 9
Efforts by the U.S. government to recommend technological assistance to
Third World nations have been viewed as partially motivated by a desire to
cool passions over the New World Information Order. One attorney in the
U.S. Information Agency stated it bluntly, "[ilt was a real quid pro quo
policy; if you abandon the rhetoric, we will help you with communications
development assistance."4 °
Frank Shakespeare, who has served both in U.S. government and private
industry, said that when the furor over the New World Information Order
was heating up, the U.S. proposed helping developing countries improve
the technology of their communication infrastructure. "I think probably we
35. Feldman, Commercial Speech, Transborder Data Flows and the Right to Communicate
under International Law, 17 INT'L LAW. 87-88 (1983).
36. Indeed, some nations, e.g., Mexico, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and most of the African
countries, are concerned that the Center not be merely a market-opening device but that it have
adequate financial support to provide a viable function as envisioned by the Commission.
37. Spero, supra note 32, at 37.
38. Id. at 38.
39. GUNTER, supra note 26, at 91.
40. Read, U.S. Government Involvement, in II COMMUNICATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 60
(1983).
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did that as a distraction to encourage the Third World countries to think of
the technical development of their communications structure and to put it in
an ordinary phrase, get off the ideological kick.", 41 Any perception that U.S.
activity in the new Center is an effort to "buy off" the Third World is likely
to impede the usefulness of the Center.
Furthermore, the credibility of the U.S. government with the Third
World in this area is already strained. When U.S. withdrawal from
UNESCO was in the discussion stages, repeated promises were made that
even if the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO, the U.S. government would
provide aid for telecommunications development outside the UNESCO
forum. The U.S. did, of course, withdraw from UNESCO, but no such
funds have been made available.
There is no question that U.S. private sector involvement could greatly
assist Third World countries to develop modern telecommunications facili-
ties and services. Many industrialized nations are already helping to build
communication infrastructures and train people in the Third World. 42 Sig-
nificant assistance has been allocated, both through U.S. bilateral aid 43 and
the International Programme for the Development of Communication
(IPDC) by Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 4
As Roland Homet has noted, there are only two paths available to remedy
the widely-held perception of inequitable distribution of communications
capabilities: to cut back Western communicating capacity or to help others
build theirs up.45 "If we do not do the latter, we will certainly suffer the
former," Homet has warned, because nations which consider themselves
"have nots" will surely erect barriers to the "haves" information mobility. 46
The key to spurring development in the Third World lies in the private
sector. The question is whether the marketplace is adequate for such in-
volvement or if the proposed Center would enhance U.S. private enterprise.
The structure, source of funding, staff, and overall policy orientation are
therefore issues of concern.
41. Shakespeare spoke at a conference at the U.S. State Department in December, 1981.
His remarks are excerpted in Technology Change, Communication, Control and Censorship, in
II ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION, at 38 (1981).
42. Japan has already taken steps in support of the Commission's recommendations, includ-
ing establishing training programs for students from developing countries, and supports the
proposed Center. International Communications News (Apr. 26, 1985), at 1-3.
43. The U.S. has tended to prefer bilateral aid to multilateral to avoid bureaucratic politi-
cization.
44. Bolla, What the Third World Wants, in II COMMUNICATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 14
(1983).
45. Homet, Policy Options for the Future, in II ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION 80
(1981).
46. Id.
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Among the immediate problems identified by the U.S. are the manage-
ment of the Center and its degree of independence from the ITU.47
Secretary-General Butler maintains that the Center was intended to be and
should be part of the ITU. Sir Donald Maitland has since stated that the
Commission members were unanimous in envisioning the Center under the
aegis of the ITU, but that a high degree of participation by the private sector
was anticipated.48 The private sector "should have a decisive say in how the
centre is run" because the Commission looked to it to provide funding and
staff personnel. 49 This is consistent with the position of the State Depart-
ment and U.S. industry: that ITU involvement should be kept to a minimum
to avoid politicization of the ITU. s°
The U.S. government's position is that the ITU has performed its techni-
cal functions very well and that any new functions which could interfere with
its current efficiency should be avoided.51 Should the proposed Center take
on the task of disbursing funds for telecommunications development, for
example, it is feared that this would lead to increased politicization of the
ITU itself. The Center could dilute the ITU's resources and distract it from
those functions which no other organization can perform. The Center,
therefore, must be sufficiently insulated from the traditional ITU functions
to obtain U.S. support.
Another condition of U.S. governmental support is the support of U.S.
industry. U.S. industry has voiced tentative approval and willingness to
participate, at least in principle. Representatives of U.S. industry also
voiced a willingness to make cash and in-kind contributions to the Center, if
foreign businesses will also support it. 52 According to industry, however,
U.S. support should be provisional until the efficacy of the Center could be
evaluated, perhaps at the 1989 ITU Plenipotentiary.5 3
U.S. government and industry have not yet reached agreement on all
points, however. There is a reluctance by industry for a governmental
47. Sweden's position is that a strong ITU relationship is essential for the center to maintain
impartiality and neutrality. The question, of course is which tendency would have the greater
influence: would the ITU keep the center politically neutral, or would a politicized Center also
politicize the ITU? The U.S. believes the latter would occur and the U.K. and Japan agree.
48. The Missing Link: An Interview with Sir Donald Maitland, Chairman, Independent
Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development, London, INTERMEDIA 9 (Jan.
1985).
49. Id. The U.S. private sector also contributed to the financial support of the Maitland
Commission through the U.S. Foundation for World Communications Development.
50. International Communications News, June 7, 1985, at 1, 4-5.
51. Dougan, D.L., Coordinator, U.S. International Communications and Information Pol-
icy, Comments Before the ITU Administrative Council (July 8, 1985) (on file with author)
[hereinafter cited as Dougan Comments].
52. Id.
53. International Communications News June 7, 1985, at 1, 4-5.
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representative to the Center's proposed Advisory Board54 if the govern-
ment will not participate in the Center's funding. At present, the administra-
tion's budget allocates no funds for this purpose and there have been no
indications that this will be altered. Any funding, therefore, will have to be
appropriated by Congress where this issue has low visibility.55 It is also
unclear whether contributions by the private sector will be contingent upon
government funding.
B. OPPORTUNITIES
As noted, the industrialized countries offer mature, competitive markets,
often having high barriers to entry. The developing world offers a logical
market into which U.S. and foreign industry seek to expand. The constraints
of which U.S. industry complains in its attempts to compete in the develop-
ing world-lack of U.S. export credits or preferential financing, antiboycott
laws, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-could be mitigated with the
planning input of disinterested professionals, focusing on quality, long-term
goals and the availability of international financing sources. This input could
negate the "sales pitch" of foreign competition based upon these factors.
If the proposed Center were to become a vehicle for those with highly
political rhetoric and narrow economic goals, it could thwart market
efficiencies. If it were to seek to substitute planning and subsidization for
market forces would it promote less efficient and more wasteful uses of
resources in the name of redistributive policies? The Maitland Commission
Report's title, The Missing Link, suggests a maldistribution of communica-
tions wealth. Would the Center see this as a mandate to promote the
short-term gain of developing countries at the expense of the information
"haves"? If so, American business, and the attorneys who serve it, would
encounter a not-so-friendly welcome at the Center.
Attorneys can help to bring a sense of realism and bargaining to this
arena. As in any new technological enterprise, three factors must appear
simultaneously for success. First, the technology must be effective and
cost-effective. Second, the marketplace must exhibit sufficient demand for
the new technological service or goods. Third, the political and regulatory
climate must be conducive to the new technology. Attorneys, as specialists,
can evaluate the regulatory environment. In their role as generalists, attor-
54. The most logical U.S. private sector liaison to the Advisory Board is the U.S. Founda-
tion for World Communications Development, a nonprofit organization founded to support the
work of the Maitland Commission and its recommendations. See Dougan Comments, supra
note 51.
55. As of the time of writing, none of the relevant congressional committees has addressed
the issue nor have their chairmen taken positions. Unless lobbying were to raise the visibility of
this issue, U.S. governmental contribution of funds is unlikely in the near future.
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neys can relate the political climate to the technical and economic realities.
In their role as negotiators, attorneys can help achieve decisions where the
interests of all parties coincide.
Attorneys with professional expertise in the international business arena
and the regulation of communications and information flows can play a vital
role as facilitators. Technological expertise is necessary but insufficient
because most problems stem from legal roadblocks overseas, not technical
ones. Would the Center proposed in the Maitland Commission Report
facilitate or hinder the surmounting of such roadblocks? Establishment of a
center along the lines suggested by the Maitland Commission suggests that
attorneys will not only confront legal hurdles but growing international
challenges and opportunities. 56 Indeed, the American Bar Association has
adopted as one of its organizational goals the advancement of the rule of law
in the world.57 The exploding growth in international communications
represents a unique opportunity for lawyers to fulfill this goal on a functional
level.
56. The related legal issue in international communications of free flow of information,
discussed above, is one example. The U.S. information sector, although not totally void of
constraints, is based upon the premise that information and communications should move
freely across national boundaries. Converting this premise into an international consensus
enforced by law will be a major challenge to which lawyers are uniquely suited. See, e.g.,
OECD, AN EXPLORATION OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
(1983).
57. Goal Eight of the ABA provides that a major objective of the Association is to advance
the rule of law in the world.
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